Concluding Part
ALSO READ: BENIN AND THE MIDWEST REFERENDUM OF 1963. By Nowamagbe A. Omoigui, Part 2
1963
ALSO READ: BENIN AND THE MIDWEST REFERENDUM OF 1963. By Nowamagbe A. Omoigui, Part 2
1963
With unity and security on the home front, all hands were
now on deck for the final push. Balewa had decided that he would
not conduct the referendum until there was a formal government back in office
at Ibadan. By order of the federal government, the Akintola
government was reinstated on January 1st, 1963 as Premier, this time
with support from a new coalition consisting of the NCNC and his new party
called the United People’s Party (UPP). This action caused an additional
misunderstanding within the old Action Group just as it was reeling from the
report of the Coker Commission of Inquiry into management of Cocoa Marketing
Board investments and newspaper coverage of the ongoing trial of Chief Awolowo
and others for treasonable felony [Enahoro, Op. Cit.].
On January 21, Mr. Gabriel E. Longe, from Owan district of
the Afenmai Division was appointed the Supervisor of the Midwest
referendum. He had been the legal adviser to the Benin Delta Peoples
Party back in the fifties. No civil servants from the Western region were
to be selected (to avoid a conflict of interest or fear of victimization) and
no non-Midwesterners were to be given any significant roles in the
exercise. Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh was the link man to the Prime Minister
to make sure there were no mistakes at federal level.
A few days later on January 24th, the Midwest
Planning Committee met again to get updates on developments and plan for the
referendum. Two days later, on January 26th, KSY Momoh, who
had taken over from Chief Anthony Enahoro as Chairman of the Midwest Regional
Committee of the Action Group publicly announced that the Action group would
oppose the creation of the Midwest, but, unknown to him, the horse had left the
barn. On February 23rd, Midwestern dissenters from the Action
group and elements of the Midwest State Movement and NCNC entered a secret pact
to make sure the Midwest referendum was hitch free. Faced with a choice
between the party and their region, and urged on by appeals from Senator Dalton
Asemota, many opted for their region. Under such pressure Action
Group hardliners and anti-Midwest region politicians like KSY Momoh, C. Akere
and Olatunji Oye, who were all former Ministers under Akintola before the split
in the AG, decided to attend the next meeting of the Midwest Planning Committee
(MPC) on March 9th. [Vickers, Op. Cit.]
Thereafter, Oba Akenzua II resumed his tours of the Midwest
to garner support for the “Yes” vote. He was quoted as saying,
“Whoever does not drop his or her ballot paper into the
WHITE ballot box will be condemned by future generations. Even those who
die before the plebiscite takes place will be condemned in the other world, if
they die with the bad intention of voting against or persuading people to vote
against the creation of a Midwest region.” [Speech by Oba Akenzua at Agbor,
March 12, 1963]
On April 23rd, Mr. James
Otobo, a pro-Midwest politician who had decamped from the NCNC to the AG before
independence and had since crossed over to the UPP requested for a postponement
of the referendum pending clarification of certain issues.
Therefore, another meeting of the Midwest Planning Committee was
called on May 20th, followed by yet another meeting on May 30th
at which final agreement was reached on the creation of new divisions for the
Akoko-Edo and Isoko people, as well as the composition of the interim Midwest
administration.
In the meantime, on May 2nd,
tragedy struck. Senator Dalton Ogieva Asemota, Chairman of the Midwest
Planning Committee died suddenly.
THE DEATH OF SENATOR DALTON ASEMOTA
At the end of April 1963, Senator
Asemota came to Lagos to attend a scheduled meeting of the Senate. The
Senate adjourned on April 29th, and so he made plans to return to
Benin on May 2nd. On May 1st, however, he
woke up early and telephoned his older brother Pa Elekhuoba Asemota to tell him
that he would be returning to Benin the next day. Then he went to the
General Hospital in Lagos to see Dr. Laja in follow-up to a Chest X-ray he had
earlier ordered. Dr. Laja gave him a prescription, some of which the
Hospital pharmacy did not have, so he was asked to find them at a private
pharmacy. >From the hospital he went shopping but returned home at
about 3 pm to take his medications on an empty stomach. After this he
left for the Commercial Medicine Store on Nnamdi Azikiwe Street owned by his
friend, Senator Wusu from Badagry. On arrival he handed the
prescription to his friend who in turn gave it to his assistants to get the
medications. Meanwhile Senator Asemota was resting on the counter along
with his wife, Onaiwu, waiting on the prescription. Then suddenly, and
without warning he slumped.
He was then rushed to the General
Hospital Casualty department. His wife then came to my family house on
MacDonald Avenue in Ikoyi, Lagos, where we were neighbours to Chief Anthony
Enahoro on our back side and Dr. Rilwan, a well known Lagos physician, on the
other. Dr. Rilwan, my parents, and Mrs Onaiwu Asemota rushed back to the
hospital to find out what was happening, only to be directed to the mortuary
where the Senator’s lifeless body was lying. It was my father that
had the unenviable responsibility to break the devastating news to Chiefs
Omo-Osagie and Okotie-Eboh. Chief Omo-Osagie notified Pa Elekhuoba Asemota
in Benin.
Meanwhile, my father went to Dr.
Laja’s house to get permission for release and embalmment. While on their
way to the hospital the Doctor said the Senator had had an enlarged Heart on
Chest X-ray. When Senator Asemota asked him how his Chest X-Ray looked,
he told him: “It is okay, Papa.” to which the Senator responded by
smiling.
Senator Dalton Asemota, the
consensus builder, did not live to see the Midwest he worked so hard to make
possible. Descended from Chief Osemwota, the Eson, and a descendant of
the Ezomo Nehenua family of Benin, and Madam Iyeye Ero, the later Senator was
buried in the Asemota family compound after a sermon led by Reverend Akinluyi
at the St. Matthew’s Cathedral in Benin City [personal communication, Mr. DA
Omoigui]. He was replaced as Chairman of the Midwest Planning
Committee by Chief Morgan Agbontaen.
ALSO READ: Aisha Buhari: A Parody of Local Heroism
ALSO READ: Aisha Buhari: A Parody of Local Heroism
ACTIVITIES AT THE OBA'S PALACE AND
AT WARD LEVEL IN PREPARATION FOR THE REFERENDUM
Once it became apparent that the
referendum was indeed going to be held, a tactical forward HQ was established
at the Oba's Palace, Benin City. Representatives of the Midwest
State Movement met there regularly for briefing. At one of the
early meetings Oba Akenzua II warned all concerned that it was a rare event
indeed for a government to lose a referendum in its area of jurisdiction.
He reminded them that in 1962 General DeGaulle had conducted a successful
referendum for a new constitution in France.
The government of reference in the
Midwest, Oba Akenzua II was referring to, was that of the Western region,
which, inspite of public pretensions Oba Akenzua said, was opposed to
the creation of the new region. He told those gathered that no stone must
be left unturned to ensure victory in this last lap of what he said was a war
of liberation. Midwest patriots like the late Israel Amadi-Emina, Senior
Divisional Adviser for the Benin and Delta provinces to the Western region
Government were in regular attendance, at a risk to their civil service
careers in the western region, explaining the inside mechanics of Action group
rigging methods. It was from him and others in the system that all
the administrative traps in the 1959 voters’ register were learnt, including
fake names that had been planted there at the time of the voters’ registration
in 1959. Without knowing the number and identity of the fake names,
he explained, it would be impossible to get 60% of those registered
after accounting for “No” votes. It was not the intention of those who
wrote such difficult clauses into the constitution that any new region would
ever be created.
Quite apart from open campaigning
for voters to vote "YES", as well as tours to various parts of the
Midwest, detailed operational plans were made to ensure victory on polling
day. Fleets of Armels buses, for example, were leased by Chief Humphrey
Omo-Osagie and sent around the Benin province in operational support. The
Otu-Edo party machine went into high gear. Prince Shaka Momodu and his
“militia” were on alert. The Owegbe society was completely
mobilized. The Urhobo Progress Union used every avenue known to man,
including churches, to mobilize voters. Turn-out at ward level all over
the state was planned to be close to 100% to make up for unknown ghost
voters.
About two weeks prior to the
official referendum, to minimize uncertainty, at every potential polling
station in every ward vote forecasts were generated by Midwest enthusiasts,
based on a pre-referendum poll. Records were meticulously collected from
hut to hut and house to house and recorded with entries for "Total
Electors", "Total entitled to vote (based on the 1959 federal
register)", "Number of people dead (since the 1959 federal
elections)", "Number of people that have left the area (since the
1959 federal elections)", "Number of people likely to vote
'Yes'", and "Number of people likely to vote 'No'." On
this basis detailed plans were made to target potential "No" votes to
convince them otherwise, through education, direct lobbying, and traditional
sanctions. Many of such "No" votes had been confused by
conflicting campaigns to vote against the creation of the Midwest by some
interests. Anti-Midwest campaigners told villagers that putting
their votes in the “white box”, was a vote for return to the rule of “white
men”. Pro-Midwest campaigners told villagers that a vote in the “black
box” was a vote for “Evil”.
But more mundane methods were also
used to campaign. For example, in one case, the retired Head of a
Household asked his visitor what the whole referendum controversy was
about. What, he wondered, was he to gain from going to the polling
station at his age? The Midwest protagonist he spoke to explained it very
simply in this way: If the referendum were to approve the creation
of the Midwest, he would no longer have to travel all the way to Ibadan to
collect his pension. All he would have to do was to go to Benin City
nearby. The old man thought about what he had just heard and said:
"In that case my son, everybody in this house will go there and vote
'Yes'.”
In yet another case, this time in
Benin City itself, a local ward leader of the Action Group was approached by
some colleagues in the Action Group to notify him that party policy was to
oppose the creation of the Midwest. The gentleman concerned calmly told
his visitors that it would be sacrilege for him to go against the wishes of Oba
Akenzua II.
From June 5th until June
14th, and again from June 20th until the 25th,
massive campaign tours were undertaken by the MSM, led by Dennis Osadebay.
On July 1st, Michael Okpara, Premier of the Eastern
region, came on tour to encourage the people of the Midwest to vote
“Yes”. Also in attendance during the referendum were many other NCNC
national leaders who were made interim divisional team leaders. They
included GC Mbanugo, TOS Benson, RA Fani Kayode (who had since decamped from
the AG), RA Akinyemi, KO Mbadiwe, Akinfosile, as well as Okotie Eboh and Omo
Osagie. On or about July 10th, with all the signs pointing to
a successful referendum, even Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Action
Group, faced with dissension within the ranks of the Midwest Action Group, sent
a note from prison to his supporters urging them to vote “Yes.” (Vickers,
Op. Cit.)
THE BAUCHI MEETING:
OKOTIE-EBOH AND BALEWA’S SECOND THOUGHTS
On the surface, all had seemed set
to go for the referendum, once all the legislative bills had been passed and
the supervisor appointed. Behind the scenes, however, Chief SL Akintola
had been warning some of friends in the NPC that they were setting a precedent
by supporting the creation of the Midwest region which would someday come back
to haunt the North. It seemed clear to Akintola that if the Midwest
referendum was allowed to go forward, the Midwest would, indeed, opt out of the
West. Once the Midwest was so created, a precedent would have been set
for the creation of other regions, a prospect that was not attractive to the
northern leadership. On this basis, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa
began to have second thoughts.
In the last week of May 1963,
the supervisor of the referendum, GE Longe was summoned for what he thought was
another of his routine briefings for the Prime Minister. At this
meeting, which took place in Bauchi, rather than Lagos, he witnessed a private
show down between Okotie-Eboh and Balewa. Okotie-Eboh insisted that he
had received Sardauna’s commitment, things had gone too far and that Balewa
could not back out. After a hot exchange, Balewa conceded to Okotie-Eboh
and gave the final go ahead for the referendum [personal communication,
Kenneth Longe, Benin City]
THE REFERENDUM DIARY
The Midwest was divided into eight
districts for the purpose of the official referendum. They were Aboh,
Afemai, Asaba, Benin, Ishan, Urhobo, Warri and Western Ijaw. Counting
Stations for each of these districts were located at the Recreation Hall,
Kwale; Town Hall, Auchi; Council Hall, Asaba; Conference Hall
(Urhokpota), Benin City; Town Hall, Irrua; Council Hall, Ughelli; K.G.V. Memorial
Hall, Warri; and the Court Hall, Bomadi, respectively.
The diary below was developed from
interviews with and the personal records of Mr. D. A. Omoigui, Assistant
District Referendum Officer for Benin NE (I) in what is now known as Uhumwode
local government area.
April 6th, 1963
Upon arrival on April 6th,
1963, at the headquarters of the Referendum at Kings Square, Benin City, the
Supervisor welcomed all referendum officers. The Secretary to the
Supervisor (Mr. G. B. A. Egbe) then provided each officer with copies of the
Constitutional Referendum Act, 1962 and Constitutional Referendum Regulations,
1963 along with Circular No. 1 which contained “General Instructions. ”
The eight major Districts identified
for the Referendum were placed under District Referendum Officers (DRO).
Each district was divided into Constituencies. Assistant District
Referendum Officers (ADRO) were operationally responsible for the conduct of
the exercise in each constituency which was further subdivided into wards and finally,
1,841 polling stations. The ADRO was responsible for providing the name
and address of each polling station as well as the staff. At each polling
station, there was a Presiding Officer, two Polling Officers, one Orderly and
one female searcher in reserve. For each polling station the ADRO
reconciled the 1959 Federal Electoral register for that station and provided it
to the Presiding Officer for use in verifying the legitimacy of individual
voters on polling day. The ADRO was also responsible for instructing Polling
Officers in their duties, providing all equipment to be used and ensuring that
all ballot boxes were delivered to the District Referendum Officer at the
counting center. The DRO on the other hand was responsible for
coordination in addition to conducting the count at the counting center.
Only he had the legal authority to open each ballot box, but he was allowed to
delegate that responsibility to the ADRO if necessary. At the end of the
Referendum every officer was expected to submit a report on his work.
Public information leaflets with
directions on “How to Vote” were printed at the Nigerian National Press, Ltd on
Malu road, Apapa, in Lagos. Voters were instructed on eight basic steps:
1.
Find out where your Polling Station is (same as it was in
1959)
2.
Find out when Polling day is. (To be announced by the Prime
Minister)
3.
Go to the Polling Station.
4.
Go to the table where the Polling Officers are sitting.
(Show your card or provide your name, address and registration number, subject
to challenge by any of the polling agents representing various political
parties)
5.
Have your left forefinger marked with special ink.
6.
Take your officially stamped ballot paper. (Your
registration card will also be stamped)
7.
Go to the screened compartment and place your ballot in
either the white box for YES or the Black Box for NO.
8.
Leave the Polling Station.
Thursday April 18th, 1963
The Supervisor welcomed all
referendum officers back to Benin City. Based on advance reports, claims
for reimbursement according to standard civil service rules were received from
officers and requested financial advances made to enable them discharge their
duties. Some had trekked for many miles through bush paths infested with
wild animals just to identify polling station locations. Others had the
problem of dealing with a low proportion of all-season motorable roads and made
requests for back-up LandRovers. Then there was the little detail
of paying for supervising presiding officers who either had cars or
motor-cycles, rather than those who would need transportation
arrangements. This was necessitated by concerns about communication,
particularly during rains.
Having secured the names of all
polling stations and names of officers (recruited locally) expected to man
them, as well as reconciled voters’ lists, the officers were now ordered to
begin an intensive lecture tour for all polling officers. Booklets
containing detailed, standardized instructions were distributed to ADROs who
were expected in turn to give them to Presiding and Polling Officers.
Such pamphlets included “Instructions to Polling Officers”,
“Instructions to Referendum Officers” and guidelines developed for “Law and
Order”.
The DROs on the other hand were
charged with preparing the ballot boxes and polling compartments. Boxes
were brought from Lagos, then cleaned. Their clips, nobs, nutches and
locks were tested for efficacy. Each Referendum Officer was given two delicate
specially designed security keys and then trained how to use them.
Between April 18th and 20th,
Mr. Egbe organized additional short lectures on various aspects of their
duties. Clarification was provided, for example, for use of two
voters' lists in sub-divided wards. Further instructions were issued by
the Supervisor regarding the importance of ensuring that the exact number of
voters in the register for each polling station was precise and could be
defended in court. They were then ordered to return to their districts
and constituencies until the next scheduled meeting on Monday May 13th,
1963.
In the Uhumwode District Council
area, the ADRO, Mr. D. A. Omoigui, conducted lectures to polling officials at
10 am and 4 pm respectively, at the Council Hall, Ehor and the Eyaen Court Hall
on Tuesday 23rd and Friday 26th of April.
May 13th, 1963
The meeting of DROs and ADROs
originally scheduled for May 13th had to be put off until May 20th because
the Supervisor had been invited to a meeting of representatives of political
parties of the Midwest at Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa’s house in Lagos on the
same day. At that meeting, party representatives from the NCNC, AG,
MPC and UPP requested assurances that they could discuss any concerns about
arrangements for the referendum with the Supervisor, including compliance with
the referendum regulations. They also wanted clarification about the powers of
their polling agents and their ability to raise objections about specific
Referendum Officers and polling officials with alleged party sympathies which
might be detrimental to their cause. The Prime Minister directed
the Supervisor to keep all parties informed of his activities.
May 20th, 1963
On May 20, 1963, his referendum
officers submitted the ratified figures based on an audit of voters projected
for each polling station to the Supervisor. Residual problems with the
inspection and testing of ballot boxes were reported for Benin City, Ubiaja,
Warri and Ughelli and arrangements made to address them. The list of locations
where new polling booths were to be constructed and the associated costs were
obtained. There were discussions about line item costs of contracting
private typists and hiring of outboard engines in riverain areas.
Officers were warned against any non-neutral activities, which might bring the
referendum into disrepute. They were alerted that the Supervisor could change
lists of polling officers recommended if there were complaints of
favoritism. Having been directed to continue lectures to Polling Officers,
work to get all ballot boxes ready, make arrangements for construction of
polling booths and compartments, and packaging of equipment for each polling
station, they were asked to return on Monday June 10th for further
instructions. It was expected that the referendum might take place at the
end of June.
June 10th, 1963
At this meeting it was made clear
that the referendum would not take place in June as earlier hoped.
Discussion focused on estimates for construction of screens and booths.
The Supervisor expressed concern that in the past, such items were discarded
after elections. He expressed the hope that the use of anti-termite
frames would enhance reusability and save money. He also directed the
officers to ensure that all materials and equipment supplied for the referendum
was returned in good condition. They were expected to plan this ahead and
rehearse their plans, in order to identify transport and security requirements.
Instructions for the counting of
votes were then issued. The procedure was rigidly spelled out to the Referendum
Officers as follows:
1.
All boxes, envelopes and articles delivered by the Presiding
Officers were to be checked.
2.
The Returning Officer would then be given the statement of
invalid papers.
3.
An accounting was then to be made of unused ballot papers,
unused tendered ballot papers, spoilt ballot papers and canceled papers.
4.
At this point the returning officers would be provided
pencils, clips and forms for “Record of Votes.” (Form C1)
5.
The seal on each Ballot box was then to be broken, the box
unlocked and its contents emptied on the counting table, after which the
returning officer begins counting the ballots, face upwards in bundles of 100
each, removing any further invalid papers.
6.
If ballots were unmarked with official markings or issued in
a different polling station they were to be rejected, and the word “rejected”
written boldly on them. If any rejection was contested by a party
counting agent the phrase “Rejection objected to” was to be inscribed under the
word “Rejected.”
7.
At this point the returning officer would complete the
‘Record of Votes’, sign and hand it over to the ADRO along with unsealed
envelopes containing rejected and counted papers from the WHITE and BLACK
boxes.
8.
Then the ADRO would tally the total number of votes in each
box, total number of valid votes, and the number of rejected papers.
9.
After each of two boxes from every polling station had been
counted and tallied, the numbers for the constituency were to be totalled and
reconciled with the numbers of ballot papers and boxes originally provided to
each polling station and the constituency as well as the Voters’ register.
10.
At this point the statement would be signed and dated by the
ADRO
11.
Form C2, containing all figures, was then to be declared
publicly for that constituency and a copy sent to the DRO.
Before parting ways to their
specific zones of responsibility, they were reminded to continue training
polling officers, preparing ballot boxes and building up parcels of equipment
for each polling station. It was anticipated that they would meet again
on Monday July 1st.
On June 12th, 1963,
however, the Prime Minister announced on radio that the long awaited Midwest
referendum would take place on Saturday, July 13th, 1963.
Therefore, all Referendum Officers were summoned back to Benin City.
June 13th, 1963
At this meeting detailed
instructions were issued regarding the impending referendum. The Supervisor, Mr.
GE Longe, did not attend because he had to go to Lagos for an
assignment. As a result, he made arrangements to make field trips
to various locations between June and July 13th.
His address at the meeting was read
out in his behalf. To ensure authenticity, he decided to restrict the
power to appoint polling agents to the Midwest Regional Secretaries of the four
recognized parties, namely the UPP, AG, NCNC and MPC. He did so to avoid
town or district secretaries sending all sorts of unverifiable names. Of
the four polling agents approved in each polling station, two were for
political parties in favor of the creation and two for parties against the
creation of the Mid-West. A similar formula was used for the
Counting agents.
However, Referendum Officers were
only authorized by law to guide political parties in this process, if so
requested by the parties involved, but not actually solicit them to make
appointments.
For Law and Order, the Police was
provided with the list of all polling stations and their locations, as well as
collecting points for ballot boxes at the end of polling.
The ADRO (HQ), Mr. Edgal, was to
distribute supplies of public leaflets and posters to referendum officers.
Officers were expected to release these every week, assisted by the Western
region Ministry of Information and the Federal Territory Ministry of
Information.
Once again it was emphasized that
DROs rehearse how to open Ballot boxes during the count. Polling Screens
were supplied directly to those polling stations located on motorable
roads. For those which could be so reached or which were located on bush
paths that were not large enough to allow porters carry the sticks on which the
cloth screen would be mounted, presiding officers were paid up to 10 shillings to
make local arrangements in the bush for sticks. Presiding Officers
in remote unmotorable areas were also charged with the construction of polling
booths for a fee not to exceed 4 pounds. For stations in villages on
motorable roads (or accessible by an outboard launch or canoe), two polling
screens were to be used as a booth while sheds could be constructed in front of
the booth to reduce heat. Presiding Officers were paid up to 15 shillings
for each shed so constructed.
On the basis of these guidelines Mr.
Longe asked the Officers to estimate the numbers of booths, bush sticks, and
sheds they would need in the more remote areas of the Midwest.
Because polling screens at that time
were made out of anti-termite timber and highly durable cloth, they cost the
Government over 3,000 pounds. Therefore, detailed arrangements were made for
their storage in the event of future use after the referendum.
Officers were then told to put final
touches to their list of names of presiding, polling and returning officers.
These lists would then be used to prepare vouchers for their
remuneration. Formal certificates of appointment would also be
issued. Each returning officer was paid 7/6d.
June 24th, 1963
Mr. Longe addressed the DROs.
A checklist of requirements was itemized and reviewed. They were asked to
collect the certificates for polling and presiding officers, as well as the
certificates to be attached to each copy of the voters’ lists given to each
presiding officer. Arrangements were completed with Messrs Edgal
and Odikpo for the transportation of polling screen frames, as well as
collection of ballot boxes, publicity materials, materials and equipment for
the counting centers. Addresses of collecting centers were
confirmed and transport arrangements reviewed for collection of Ballot boxes
and polling equipment at the end of the poll. Names of counting clerks
and other polling officials were confirmed.
Finally, DROs were told to return on
July 1st along with their ADROs.
July 1st, 1963
At this crucial meeting, a number of
last minute details were clarified and rehearsed. The list of equipment
for each Counting Center was rehashed. Lists of packeted articles for use
at each polling station and items to be handed over to ADROs by presiding
officers at the close of polling were reviewed. In addition to handing
over count results, along with all envelopes, articles, ballot boxes and keys
used at polling and counting stations, ADROs were charged to write post-mortem
reports on the referendum in their various constituencies, explaining any
particular difficulties encountered and making suggestions for future
improvement.
Mr. Longe issued a general approval
of all the counting clerks, orderlies and female searchers that had been
nominated. In larger towns ballot papers were to be distributed on the
morning of the poll. In scattered but motorable areas, ballot papers were
to be distributed the evening before at identified central locations to
presiding officers. For very remote areas, including villages located deep
inside the Delta, referendum officers were advised to make arrangements to
collect their ballot papers from the Referendum HQ a few days prior, subject to
arrangements for security. Ballot paper stamps were issued to referendum
officers during the meeting but were not to be distributed until the ballot
papers were being given to presiding officers. Officers were reminded
once again to notify presiding officers that unstamped ballot papers would be
rejected during the count.
The critical importance of the
Ballot paper account was again stressed, with emphasis on the need for
appropriate signatures appended by polling agents, presiding and referendum
officers. Another very important document Mr. Longe was concerned about
was the certified extract of the Voters' list. Each extract was to be
certified and officially marked. Mr. Longe emphasized again and again the need
for referendum officers to think pro-actively and ensure that all elements of
the referendum could be defended in court. As of this time political
parties had not made their choices of polling agents known but it was obvious
that polling agents would in fact be appointed by the time the referendum was
conducted.
Officers were directed to
cross-check the adequacy of lighting at their counting centers.
Counting was expected to begin once ballot papers arrived from individual
constituencies. Once results were collated and signed, they were to be
telephoned to phone number 326, the official phone number for the Referendum
Secretary (Mr. Egbe) in Benin. Simultaneously, a special courier
was to be physically sent with the original signed and certified Form C2 to the
Secretary in Benin. (A copy of Form C2 was to be retained by the ADRO and
DRO on site).
Posters were to be put up at each
polling station at least seven (7) days prior to the referendum. Extra
posters were made available to replace those destroyed by rain or removed by
unscrupulous characters opposed to the referendum.
Final lists of polling officials
were accepted. Payment for services was to be made as approved at the
various counting centers after close of polling.
For law and order, the Police
expressed the opinion that it would be unnecessary for referendum officials to be
escorted by the Police while moving around on polling day. However, the
Police promised to send out periodic patrols. Therefore, Mr. Longe
suggested that ADROs identify a central location to their subordinates at which
they could be reliably reached. Whatever movements were to be undertaken
by the ADROs was to be prioritized, focusing in particular on ensuring that all
ballot boxes arrive safely at the counting center. This
unwillingness of the Police to provide bodyguards for referendum officials prompted
some referendum officers to hire their own private bodyguards. The DROs
in particular were directed to move about their districts in a supervisory role
but were advised to use their counting centers as their offices in order that
they could be reached if necessary, either by their ADROs, the Police, or the
Supervisor.
For transport, one lorry was
allocated to every district except riverain Western Ijaw which was supplied
with motor launches. The Lorries were to be used to distribute polling equipment
and materials and recollect them at the end of polling. (Polling Screens
were to be stored at central locations at a cost of rental not to exceed 15
pounds yearly). Alternative special arrangements were made for the
collection of ballot boxes. Each counting center was alloted several
back-up vehicles and arrangements made to ensure that no more than one
collection trip was made by any one vehicle. At about 4pm vehicles were
to be deployed to the farthest polling stations from the counting centers.
At 7pm these vehicles would then begin a preplanned, secure one-way trip back
to the counting station, stopping to pick up ballot boxes at predesignated
polling stations.
Lastly, officers were requested to
return on July 19th, following the referendum, for final debrief and audit
prior to departure back to their regular jobs on Monday July 22nd 1963.
POLLING DAY, July 13th, 1963
In most constituencies – except in
the Benin and Asaba divisions - polling went off without major problems.
In Benin City, Mr. C. Akere, a known Action Grouper, reportedly kept
coming in and out of the Headquarters of the referendum on Ring Road with
complaints, particularly about the unexpected massive turn-out of voters.
On each occasion, Mr. Longe would ask him to bring evidence of
malpractice but he had none to show.
According to Mr. D. A. Omoigui, ADRO
for Benin NorthEast (I) there were few Police patrols in his
constituency. The Police stayed put at Ehor without transport, cutting
off polling officials in the Eyaen area from any kind of formal security
protection. Many were beaten up or rough-handled by Action Group thugs
who even tried to prevent voters from voting. For example, Mr. H.R.A.
Iruegbae, then Presiding Officer at the Ugha Native Authority School Idumwumgha
was beaten and his plastic bag seized. When the ADRO went to get Police at
Ehor, he found them at Adobadan. The procession then returned to
Idumwungha where for unexplained reasons the Police Officer in Charge, Mr.
Izevbizua-Iyamu, refused to arrest the thugs or clear them out of the polling
station. This type of Police behavior was not universal. At Ehor,
for example, another Police officer, one Mr. Omonudo, carried out his security
assignments with despatch and seriousness when reports were made to him.
At Orio, a privately hired bodyguard called “Dogo” from Auchi physically
threw obstructionists out of the polling station when the Police did not show
up.
During counting at the Conference
Hall in Benin, a special representative of Chief Akintola who had been sent to
“monitor” the counting, was chased out of the Hall by members of the Owegbe
society, when it transpired that his name was not on the official list of
agents representing the various political parties.
July 18th, 1963
After interim results from 22 out of
30 polling constituencies had already shown on July 16th that over
60% voted “Yes”, final results were released by Mr. Gabriel Esezobor Longe on
Thursday July 18th, 1963. Almost 90% of voters had opted to
leave the western region. Shortly, thereafter, there was an attempt by
the legal adviser to the Action Group, Barrister SO Ighodaro, to file a motion
contesting the referendum. However, this was later withdrawn.
WHY WAS THERE OPPOSITION FROM SOME KEY MIDWESTERNERS IN THE ACTION GROUP TO THE CREATION OF THE REGION?
Those from Benin who opposed the
creation of the Midwest are best placed to explain their actions, party loyalty
aside. Some were definitely influenced by fear that they
would find themselves in the opposition in a new Midwest, and would be denied
government patronage. In an interview in the United States, Chief Anthony
Enahoro made reference to the fact that at a certain stage, Chief Samuel
Akintola was using the Midwest issue for internal power play within the Action
group. It is not clear whether, this, therefore, was his reason for
acting the way he did, as a rival and opponent of Chief Akintola within the
party. In any case this would not explain his position on the matter back
in the fifties.
According to testimony by Phillip
Obazee, who was in a position to know what transpired in Action group circles
within his own ward in Benin,
“What may explain the
"why" question as I know it from my ward-level
intelligence gathering at that time are as follows: (1) Trust - many people
in the Benin and Delta Provinces were very leery of the NCNC agenda; (2)
Keep them in Check - the Igbos, like the Japanese in the U.S.A in the 1980',
were buying major real estate holdings, owned most of the businesses along
Forestry and Mission Roads, and were gaining very strong grips on the
political and economic machinery of Benin Province; (3) B2 (Chief
Omo-Osagie) agenda and the politics of cult intimidation - some people were
of the opinion then that Chief Omo-Osagie and the politics of cult that his
followers were known for would perhaps soon hold the Palace and the people
of Benin Province a hostage; (4) NPC opportunism and Lagos Street
factor - it was not clear to many why the North would have interest in the
creation of Mid-West with its attendant new-breed of "money wadding"
opportunists (Was the North vying to be noticed because of the Lagos
Street Factor?); (5) Free Education - many people were afraid that free
elementary education practiced in Benin and Delta Provinces could not be
sustained under Mid-West Region; and (6) 1897 factor - the vestiges of the
defeat of the Binis in 1897 cannot be ruled out in the metaphysical calculus
of asking the Binis to go against the political order of the day, and the
Binis would for a long time continue to be laggards in embracing new
political dispensations, particularly where those new dispensations are
masterminded by leaders of checkered history.” [personal communication, Edo-Nation Egroup, December 8th, 2002]
intelligence gathering at that time are as follows: (1) Trust - many people
in the Benin and Delta Provinces were very leery of the NCNC agenda; (2)
Keep them in Check - the Igbos, like the Japanese in the U.S.A in the 1980',
were buying major real estate holdings, owned most of the businesses along
Forestry and Mission Roads, and were gaining very strong grips on the
political and economic machinery of Benin Province; (3) B2 (Chief
Omo-Osagie) agenda and the politics of cult intimidation - some people were
of the opinion then that Chief Omo-Osagie and the politics of cult that his
followers were known for would perhaps soon hold the Palace and the people
of Benin Province a hostage; (4) NPC opportunism and Lagos Street
factor - it was not clear to many why the North would have interest in the
creation of Mid-West with its attendant new-breed of "money wadding"
opportunists (Was the North vying to be noticed because of the Lagos
Street Factor?); (5) Free Education - many people were afraid that free
elementary education practiced in Benin and Delta Provinces could not be
sustained under Mid-West Region; and (6) 1897 factor - the vestiges of the
defeat of the Binis in 1897 cannot be ruled out in the metaphysical calculus
of asking the Binis to go against the political order of the day, and the
Binis would for a long time continue to be laggards in embracing new
political dispensations, particularly where those new dispensations are
masterminded by leaders of checkered history.” [personal communication, Edo-Nation Egroup, December 8th, 2002]
Separately, in Warri, for example,
there were minority-within-minority fears among certain Itsekiri leaders.
AFTER THE REFERENDUM
In Ibadan, less than 48 hours
afterwards, the Premier, SL Akintola ordered civil servants of Midwestern
origin to leave, with less than 24 hours notice. As federal
referendum officers were returning to their places of work in Lagos on July 22nd,
long columns of vehicles carrying over 600 Midwestern families returning from
Ibadan, jammed the roads from Owo, and headed for Benin City. As one
witness put it, it was like the “great trek.”
For many months, Benin City
became a large refugee camp with Western region returnees squatting all over
the place in open fields, verandahs etc. There were very few
quarters and the sleepy old provincial capital with dusty untarred roads had
long been denied the kind of infrastructure that could support such a sudden
population influx. Drivers of western region official vehicles disposed
of their vehicles in ways that depended on their place of origin. If they
were Yoruba, they tried to make it to Ifon just beyond the border. If
they were Midwesterners, they hid their vehicles within Midwestern
territory. As things turned out, to this day, the Western region has
never shared its joint assets with the Midwest, a sub-region which accounted
for one third of its area and one quarter of its population. All these
years the Midwest (later Bendel State) has had to remain contented with
whatever fixed assets were physically on the ground as of August 9, 1963 and
could not be moved out. The Western region and its successor States took
what was left.
THE DEATH OF CHIEF GABRIEL ESEZOBOR
LONGE
On August 6, 1963, death came
calling again. Gabriel Esezobor Longe, the supervisor of the well
organized Midwest referendum and former legal adviser to the Benin Delta
Peoples party, died suddenly, in his sleep, in Benin City. He was 59 years
old. He had been born in 1904, and was a successful teacher for many
years before he went to study law and was called to the Bar on August 20th,
1951 [personal communication, Kenneth Longe, Benin City].
AUGUST 9, 1963
According
to testimony from the late Mr. Ebohon, driver to the late Chief H Omo-Osagie,
the only time he ever saw the Iyase of Benin shed tears was when the Midwest
was finally created (personal communication, Dr. Obas Ebohon).
On August 9, 1963 Chief SL
Akintola moved a motion in the Western House of Assembly to excise the 30
regional constituencies of the Midwest from the original 124 constituencies of
the West [Daily Times, August 10, 1963]. The motion was seconded
and carried. On August 12, 1963, Chief D. C. Osadebay, at that time the
President of the Senate, was appointed Administrator for the new region.
Along with his new administrative team (Appendix 2) he arrived in Benin
from Lagos via Ibadan, on Saturday August 17th to resume duty [Daily
Times, August 18, 1963]. When he met Akintola at the Ibadan airport,
Osadebay was presented with a complete set of laws of Western Nigeria and a
beaded puff. On August 19th, Chief SL Akintola of the
Western region congratulated the 29 Midwestern members of the Western House of
Assembly and 28 Midwestern members of the House of Chiefs on the creation of
their new region [Daily Times, August 20, 1963]. On August
27, 1963, the Administrative Council of Midwestern Nigeria declared Benin City
the capital and administrative headquarters of the Midwestern region, in a move
Dennis Osadebay described as “appropriate”, since most Midwesterners claimed
ancestral origins from the ancient city. On October 8, 1963 the
Akoko-Edo and Isoko divisions were created out of the Afenmai and Urhobo
divisions, respectively, in line with a pre-referendum promise. On
January 8, 1964, as the 6-month term of office of the interim administration
was coming to an end, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa moved the Midwest Act in the
Federal House of Representatives. The new Midwest regional constitution,
negotiated in great detail, contained provisions for protection of ethnic
minorities like the Itsekiri.
Parliamentary elections were
then held in the Midwest on February 3rd, which the NCNC won with 53
out of 65 seats. Thereafter, posts were shared in a zoning formula.
Chief Samuel Jereton Mariere was appointed Governor, while Dennis Osadebay
became the first Premier, and Oba Akenzua II the President of the House of
Chiefs. Mr. P.K. Tabiowo became the first Speaker of the House of
Representatives. (See Appendix 3 for the list of names of the first
cabinet)
Post-Script
After the Midwest had been successfully
created and was fully functioning, there was an attempt in 1964-65 by KSY
Momoh, an Action Group operative, to get a court injunction to declare
the region illegal, based on criticisms of the delimitation exercise that
accompanied the creation of the region. The suit was thrown out by then
Chief Judge Chike Idigbe (personal communication, Mr. KO Longe).
ALSO READ: At 56, our history is our inspiration as we fight for the second freedom- Opeyemi Farinde
ALSO READ: At 56, our history is our inspiration as we fight for the second freedom- Opeyemi Farinde
CONCLUSION
What began as a request to colonial
authorities in 1926 from Oba Eweka II, took on a sense of political urgency in
1948, and was finally attained during the reign of his son, Akenzua II, on
August 9, 1963. On August 9, 1964, at the first anniversary celebration
of the Midwestern region, the first Governor, Chief S J Mariere, said, among
other things,
“I do not think that it is an
exaggeration to say that if, in any sense, one single person could be said to
be responsible for a turning point, Oba Akenzua II must be classified as one
such person…..when, later this evening, I invite all present to drink with me
the toast of the Federal republic and the toast of Midwestern Nigeria, I am
sure that, in some special way, we will be drinking the toast of Oba Akenzua
II, Uku Akpolokpolo, Omo n’Oba n’Edo. Along with toast, we will also be
drinking the toast of other potentates of Midwestern Nigeria who, in diverse
ways and fashions, in several nooks and corners, in places low and high, in
circumstances difficult and easy, have contributed their quota and mite towards
our successful deliverance into the promised land, whose first anniversary
today we celebrate………In quite a different vein we must also remember those
great men and women who toiled and sweated on the journey to this land of our
fathers but died in harness when already the land was in sight. Today, I
am sure, that the spirit of late Senator Dalton Ogieva Asemota and the soul of
Chief Gabriel Esezobor Longe will specially rejoice in their abode in the great
beyond…..” [Ayeni, P (Ed): Midwestern Nigeria First Anniversary 1964.
Ministry of Information, Benin City]
In addition to Senator Dalton Ogieva
Asemota and Chief Gabriel Esezobor Longe, many of the great figures mentioned
in this essay have since died, some violently. Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh,
the great enabler, was assassinated during the January 15, 1966 coup. The
story I have related traces the origins of a determined nationalist agitation,
confident in its historical heritage, pure in its strategic formulation,
complex in its operational implementation, but persistent nonetheless, complete
with the kind of ups and downs, promises and betrayals that characterize all
sustained human endeavors. But, as I noted at the beginning, two lessons
stand out from the saga:
a). Political parties come and
go, but nationalities remain.
b).
Organized and united across traditional and contemporary forms of leadership,
nothing can stand in the way of the peoples of the Midwest.
Let us keep the lives of all
the great Midwesterners discussed today in our thoughts for all time.
However, let us not forget those non-Midwesterners who did their part to make
the Midwest constitutionally possible. With the exception of the UN
supervised separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia after a long civil war, what
those who fought constitutionally for the Midwest achieved has not been
replicated in Africa.
Let us ask ourselves why, to this
day, in Benin City and other towns of the Midwest, later called Bendel, and now
Edo and Delta States by military fiat, many of our heroes have never been
honored or memorialized. Why are there no statues, buildings, airports or
prominent streets named after many of these great men and women who achieved
the impossible? Why have they not been recommended for post-humous
awards?
It is my recommendation, therefore,
that the Edo and Delta Houses of Assembly should create a special award titled
“Hero of the Midwest” to be conferred on the visionaries, strategists,
operational and tactical leaders, key allies and referendum officers whose
efforts ensured our “successful deliverance into the promised land.”
Furthermore, the history of the creation of the Midwest should be taught in
schools and a designated area should be established in Benin to be named the
“Midwest Memorial”. The memorial should contain a small museum, have
statues of the most prominent fighters and plaques dedicated to all those that
made it possible.
On my part, as a son of Benin, in
the Midwestern region of Nigeria, on behalf of my generation and future
generations, I say to all of you alive or dead, who made it possible, “Thank
you.”
APENDIX ONE
List of Referendum Officers and
Assistant Referendum Officers and their respective Areas
HEADQUARTERS
|
|
Supervisor
|
Mr. Edward Longe
|
Assistant
District Referendum Officer
|
Mr. Edgal
|
Secretary
|
Mr. G. B. A. Egbe
|
Referendum
Officer
|
District
|
Assistant
Referendum Officer
|
Division
|
F Obuku
|
ABOH
|
Pius Aghenu
|
Ukwuani Aboh East
|
Paul Aninta
|
Ndosimile Aboh West
|
||
PGO Nwanjei
|
ASABA
|
HU Ogbo
|
Asaba North East
|
NN Onyebujo
|
Asaba North West
|
||
AI Buzugbe
|
Asaba South East
|
||
POK Okanigbe
|
Asaba South West
|
||
RME Aitalegbe
|
AFENMAI
|
DE Ayeni
|
Ivbiosakon Afenmai NW (II)
|
MM Momodu
|
Agenebode Afenmai SE
|
||
ME Ajakaye
|
Auchi Afenmai NE
|
||
EL Jamgbade
|
Igarra (Akoko Oke) Afenmai NW I
|
||
O Oronsaye
|
BENIN
|
FU Amayo
|
Benin Central West
|
E. Fadaka
|
Benin Central East
|
||
DA Omoigui
|
Benin NE (I) Uhumwode
|
||
I Igiehon
|
Benin West (I)
|
||
GO Aiwerioba
|
Benin SE Iyekorhionmwon
|
||
CGA Okoh
|
Benin NE (II) Akugbe
|
||
MO Igbinokpogie
|
Benin West (II)
|
||
AA Ordia
|
ISHAN
|
JO Omosun
|
Ishan South East
|
MO Elebesunu
|
Ishan West Central
|
||
MA Borha
|
Ishan North East
|
||
FA Ijewere
|
Ishan North West
|
||
SW Anaughe
|
URHOBO
|
JR Abohwo
|
Central Urhobo East
|
M Ayisire
|
Central Urhobo West
|
||
JO Ogedegbe
|
Isoko North (Urhobo West I)
|
||
JA Agwae
|
Isoko South (Urhobo West II)
|
||
PWA Ogigirigi
|
Urhobo East (I)
|
||
PA Ewetuya
|
Urhobo East (II)
|
||
FO Moore
|
WARRI
|
OO Pessu
|
Benin River
|
Princewill Egworitse
|
Warri Area
|
||
BD Daubri
|
WESTERN IJAW
|
Martin Abidde
|
West Ijaw (I)
|
WJ Abere
|
West Ijaw (II)
|
APPENDIX 2
All-Party Midwest Interim
Administrative Council
(August 19, 1963 – February 8, 1964)
(August 19, 1963 – February 8, 1964)
Administrator
|
Dennis Osadebay (NCNC)
|
Deputy Administrator, Local
Government
|
Chief H Omo-Osagie (NCNC)
|
Deputy Administrator, Chieftaincy
|
Chief SJ Mariere (NCNC)
|
Deputy Administrator, Finance and
Economic development
|
James Otobo (UPP)
|
Commissioner, Health
|
Reverend Edeki (UPP)
|
Commissioner, Works and Transport
|
Dr. Christopher Okojie (NCNC)
|
Commissioner, Justice
|
Mr. Webber Egbe (NCNC)
|
Commissioner, Education
|
Chief Oputa-Otutu (NCNC)
|
Commissioner, Information
|
Mr. FH Utomi (NCNC)
|
Commissioner, Lands & Housing
|
Mr. N. Ezonbodor
(NCNC)
|
Commissioner, Internal Affairs
|
Mr. BIG Ewah
(UPP)
|
Commissioner, Trade & Industry
|
Apostle John Edokpolor
(MPC)
|
Commissioner, Agriculture and
Natural resources
|
Mr. KSY Momoh
(AG)
|
Commissioner, Labour and Social
Welfare
|
Mr. JD Ojobolo
(UPP)
|
Commissioner, without portfolio
|
Mr. Albert Okojie (MPC)
|
Commissioner, without portfolio
|
Mr. JO Oye (AG)
|
Commissioner, Establishments &
Training
|
Mr. PK Tabiowo (sworn in on August
27, 1963) (NCNC)
|
APPENDIX 3
THE FIRST MIDWEST CABINET, 1964
Premier
|
Dr. the Hon. Chief Dennis Osadebay
|
Minister, Local Government
& Chieftaincy
|
Chief H Omo-Osagie
|
Minister, Economic Development
|
Chief O. Oweh
|
Minister, Finance
|
Chief O.I. Dafe
|
Minister, Health
|
Mr. John Igbrude
|
Minister, Works and Transport
|
Dr. Christopher Okojie
|
Minister, Justice
|
Mr. Webber G. Egbe
|
Minister, Education
|
Chief FH Utomi
|
Minister, Establishments
|
Mr. John Umolu
|
Minister, Information
|
Reverend Imevbore Edeki
|
Minister, Lands & Housing
|
Mr. ES Ukonga
|
Minister, Internal Affairs
|
Prince Shaka Momodu
|
Minister, Trade & Industry
|
Mr. JA Orhorho
|
Minister, Agriculture and Natural
resources
|
Mr. VI Amadasun
|
Minister, Labour and Social
Welfare
|
Mr. EO Imafidon
|
Minister of State (Finance)
|
Mr. GI Oviasu
|
Minister of State (Agriculture
& Natural Resources)
|
Chief FU Osuhor
|
Minister of State (Local
Government & Chieftaincy)
|
Hon. LST Fufeyin
|
Minister of State (Premier’s
Office)
|
His Highness, Enosegbe II, Onogie
of Ewohimi
|
Minister of State (Premier’s
Office)
|
His Highness, Gbenoba II, Obi of
Agbor
|
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